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THE SCOPE OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN PROTECTION
UNDER TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAWS
John B. Pegramt

INTRODUCTION

I.

Perhaps it was the absence of an effective design I protection statute
which led to the development in the United States of a mode of protection
under trademark and unfair competition law. Perhaps it was simply the
desire to maximize both the manner and term of protection. Whatever the
cause, it is clear that today, some of the most utilized forms of product
configuration protection are based on trademark law and are found in the
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). 2
This Article addresses in four parts the scope of industrial design protection under trademark and unfair competition laws. In part one, some
fundamentals of trademark law are reviewed. Part two provides an overview of trademark and unfair 'competition protection of product
configurations. Part three examines the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 3 The Article concludes with
a commentary on the appropriateness of protecting product configurations
under trademark Jaw.
II.

SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF TRADEMARK LAW

The concepts underlying trademark law and the relevant judicially formulated law of unfair competition4 are similar. Both bodies of law apparently originated in England where purchasers could bring suit against a
seller of goods for misleading them as to their source. This theory of recovery developed into the tort of "passing off' the goods of one party as those
of another. S
The purpose of both trademark and unfair competition law is to protect
the public, as well as the source of goods identified by the trademark. 6 The
test for determining infringement in both cases is the likelihood of
© Copyright 1991, John B. Pegram.
t A.B.• 1960, Columbia College; LL.B .• 1965. New York University. Partner. Davis Hoxie
Faithfull & Hapgood. New York. N.Y.; former President, New York Patent. Trademark
and Copyright Law Association; member of the Editorial Advisory Board and former
Editor-in-Chief of The Trademark Reporter.
I. The term "design" is used here in the sense of product configuration and not in the broad
sense of any symbol or device.
. .
2. 15 US.c. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).

3. 489 US. 141 (1989).
4. Other aspects of unfair competiiion law. such as false advertising and antitrust law. are
beyond the scope of this Article.
.
5. See Bonito 489 US. at 157-58; see also Burrell. Two Hundred Years of English Trade
Mark Law, in Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT. TRADEMARK
AND COPYRIGHT LAw. 35. 38-42 (1976) [hereinafter Two HUNDRED YEARS).
6. But see Bonito. 489 US. at 154.
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confusion. An underlying issue in each is to identify the borderline between
that which may be appropriated and protected for the exclusive use of a single party, and that which should be free for use by all.
A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or any combination
thereof, which serves to indicate the source of the product with which it is
used. 7 The specific source need not be known to the purchasers of the
trademarked product. Instead, it is sufficient that a single entity exists
which controls use of the trademark. 8 The ability of a mark 9 to indicate the
source, and to distinguish that source from the source of goods made or distributed by others, is called distinctiveness.

A.

Trademark Rights Arise Through Use

In the United States, trademark rights were traditional.ly based upon
priority of appropriation of the mark and were developed through use. In
that regard, a term lO was not a trademark until it had been adopted and used
as an indication of source or origin of the product with which it was used. II
Unlike patents and copyrights, creativity is not a prerequisite to trademark
rights, and there are no specific provisions for protection of trademarks in
the United States Constitution. Following the Supreme Court's rejection of
legislation as being unconstitutionally broad,12 laws providing for federal
registration of trademarks were adopted under the commerce clause, permitting the federal government to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
between the states, and with the Indian tribes. 13 Use of a term as a mark in
7. 15 U.S.c. § 1127 (1988). In reviewing the definition of "trademark" in this section, the
United States Trademark Association's Trademark Review Commission "determined that
the terms 'symbol, or device' should not be deleted or narrowed to preclude regislration
of such things as ·color, shape, smell, sound, or configuralion which functions as a
mark." USTA Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA
President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375,421 (1987) Ihereinafter TRC
Report].
Further, S. REP. No. 515 specifically states thai "the words 'symbol or device,' " in the
Trademark Revision Act of 1988's revised definition of trademark, are intentionally
retained "so as not to' preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or
configuralions where Ihey function as trademarks." S. REP. No. SIS, 100lh Congo 2d
Sess. 44 (1988).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ lOSS, 1127 (1988).
9. "Mark" is a generic lerm for trademarks which relate to goods or products, service
marks, certification marks, and collective marks. 15 U.S.c. § 1127 (1988). Because
this Article deals with configurations of goods, "mark" is used here as an abbreviation
for trademark.
10. Trademark attorneys use the word "term" to refer to words or names without indicating
whether trademark rights exist.
II. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). This definition was changed slightly when Ihe Trademark
Revision Act of 1988 came into effect one year from its approval. I~ U.S.c. § 1127
(1988).
12. United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Pattishall, The Constitutional Foundation of
American Trademark Law, in CELEBRATING THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 63 (1988).
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commerce of the type regulated by the United States government is a prerequisite to federal registration of marks. 14 Federal registrations on the
"Principal Register" are prima facie evidence of validity, registration, own.
ership, and exclusive rights. IS

B.

The Spectrum of Protectability

Although several different categories of terms are recognized in the
field of word marks, not all are protectable as marks. In fact, protectability
of terms varies and is primarily dependent upon the degree of distinctiveness, ranging from arbitrary and fanciful to suggestive, and then, "not
merely" descriptive.
A term which is' "merely" descriptive or generic cannot be appropriated by a single entity as its mark. Merely descriptive and generic terms
are available for use by all because they describe or constitute the common
name for the subject product-.- For example, one commentator differentiates
the categories of teFms as follows:
APPLE for Apples-generic
TOMAPPLE for tomato and apple juice-descriptive
APPLE-A-DAY for vitamin tablets-suggestive
APPLE computers-fanciful
KODAK for film-arbitraryl6
As one can readily see; there exists a peculiar dividing line between
descriptive terms which are protected, and those which are·not protected
because they are "merely" descriptive. The location of a term with respect
to that dividing line depends upon whether the term has acquired "secondary meaning." The dividing line marks the boundary of distinctiveness. If
a term is not distinctive, it is not recognized as a trademark. 17 . .
The "primary meaning" of a descriptive term is what it describes. The
"secondary meaning" 'of that term indicates the source ofthe goods; developed over a period of time, through substantially continuous and exclusive
use. If one entity makes exclusive use of that term to identify its products
over a period of time, that term may develop a "secondary meaning." In
that case, the term becomes distinctive and 'is recognized as tradem~rk.
Evidence of exclusive and continuous use of a descriptive term as a mark for
five years may be accepted by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) as
prima facie ~videnceof the existence of distinctiveness. 18 The doctrine of

a

14. 15 U.s:c. § 1051 (1988). See generally Pegram, Trademark Law Revision: Section 44.
78 TRADEMARK REP. 141 (1988); Sacoff, TlJe Trademark Use Requirement in Trademark
Registration. Opposition and Cancellation Proceedings. 76 TRADEMARK REP. 99 (i 986).
15. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1057(b), 1072 (1988).
16. I J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARK LAw §§ 11.3, 11.22 (2d ed. 1984). See generally Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 E2d 4 (2d Cit, 1976)...
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1988).
.
18. [d. § 1052(0.
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secondary meaning,- however, does not apply to generic terms because such
terms cannot be appropriated for use as marks.
C.

The Role of the Courts

Design protection cases under trademark and unfair competition law
reach the courts in three principal ways: (I) appeals to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit from a PTO refusal to register a mark; (2) cases
involving infringement of registered trademarks brought directly to either
state or federal courts; and (3) cases involving unregistered trademarks and
similar unfair competition claims under federal law brought directly to
either state or federal courts. Appeals from decisions of the federal district
courts in trademark cases usually are appealable to the appropriate regional
court of appeals, not to the Federal Circuit. 19
III.

AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION PROTECTION OF PRODUCT CONFIGURATIONS

Prior to 1964, some configurations of goods were protected under state
unfair competition laws. Although some of those designs may have been so
arbitrary that distinctiveness was not an issue, in most cases, secondary
meaning was the test used to determine whether the design performed as a
mark to indicate the source of the goods. This test was analogous to the test
for determining whether trademark rights had developed in a descriptive
word or group of words, such that they qualified as "not merely" descriptive. 20 Functional designs, like generic words, were not protected but were
free for all to use.. The test for infringement was likelihood of confusion.
A.

What Designs Should Be Freefor All to Use?

The principal subject of product and container design litigation has
been the scope of func"tionality, that is, whether a particular configuration
should be free for all to use. In the 1938 decision of Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit CO.,21 the Supreme Court denied design protection to the pillow-like
shape of Shredded Wheat cereal, explaining the underlying proposition as
follows:
Where an article may be rnanufactured by all, a particular
manufacturer can no rnore assert exclusive rights in a forrn in
which the public has become accustorned to see the article and
which, in the minds of the public, is primarily associated with the
article rather than a particular producer, than it can in the case of
19. The exception is that an appeal in a case which also involves an issue under the patent
laws is to the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.c. § 1295 (1988).
20. Cf In re Deister Concentrator Co.• 289 F.2d 496.503 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
21. 305 U.S. III (1938).
.
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a name with similar connections in the public mind. Kellogg
Company was free to use the pillow-shaped form, subject only to
the obligation to identify its product lest it be mistaken for that of
the plaintiff. 22
.
In 1964, two cases reached the Supreme Court involving protection
against copying of product appearance under state unfair competition laws.
These cases were Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel CO.,23 involving a popular
"pole lamp," and Compco Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc.,24 involving a
fluorescent lighting fixture of a type often found on office ceilings. In both
cases, the district court held that the products were not protected by federal
patent or copyright law, but instead protected by a state prohibition of copying. 25
Sears and Compco both reversed injunctions against copying on the
basis of federal preemption by the patent laws. Objecting to state prohibition of copying for an unlimited term of an article representing too slight an
advance to be patentable, the Court in Sears stated:
Sears has been held liable here for unfair competition because
of a finding of likelihood of confusion based on.ly on the fact that
Sears' lamp was copied from Stiffers unpatented lamp and that
consequently the two looked exactly alike. Of course there could
be "confusion" as to who had manufactured these nearly identical
articles. But mere inability of the public to tell two identicaL articles apart is not enough to support an injunction against copying or
an award of damages for copying that which the federaL patent Laws
permit to be copied. Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented,
be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent
customers from being misled as to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by
imitating such markings, from misleading· purchasers as to the
source of the goods. But because of the federal patent laws a State
may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such
copying. 26
In Compco, the Court acknowledged the trial court's finding of secondary meaning in the ribbing which associated the design with the plaintiff,27
22. [d. at 120.
23. 376 U.S. 225 ( 1964).
24. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
25. Sears. 376 U.S. at 232-33: Compco. 376 U.S. at 238.
26. Sears. 376 U.S. at 232-33 (emphasis added).
27. Compco. 376 U.S. at 238.
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and further, that actual confusion had existed between purchasers. 28 Nonetheless, as in Sears, the Court held that when the design is not entitled to a
design patent or other federal statutory protection, it can be copied at will. 29
The elimination by Sears and Compeo of industrial design protection
under state unfair competition law was considered a devastating loss by
practitioners seeking design protection for clients. It appeared that the
Sears and Compeo decisions precluded protection of product configurations
under state unfair competition law, and the potential for configuration protection under existing federal law was as yet unrecognized.
B.

A Federal Law of Unfair Competition

In the wake of Sears and Compeo, practitioners sought "other federal
statutory protection," and turned to the Lanham Act, partic'ularly section
43(a).30 Literally, section 43(a) addresses false designations of origins and
false descriptions, and does not appear applicable to protection of unregistered trademarks and the configurations of goods. Nonetheless, the section
has been widely interpreted by the lower courts to create, in essence, a federallaw of unfair competition and now provides relief against infringement
of unregistered trademarks, and unfair competition arising from copying of
trade dress and certain configurations of goods. 31
C.

The Standard of Functionality

The key issue in determining the registrability of product
configurations as trademarks, and their protectability under section 43(a),
has been functionality. A leading case on the procedure for determining
functionality of product configurations is In re Deister Concentrator CO.,32
which was decided by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) in
1961, before the Sears and Compeo decisions.
Deister involved an application to register a rhombic shape, representing the outline of the working surface of a table used for ore concentrating
and coal cleaning. The table was what is known as a shaker table as shown
in Figure 1 below. 33
28. Id. at 237.
29. Id. at 238.
30. See generally McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law
During the Decade of the 1970s, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 93 (1981) (hereinafter McCarthy,
Important Trends).
31. TRC Report, supra note 7, at 426; see also S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40
(1988); H.R. REP. No. 1028, IOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1988) (citing TRC Report, supra
note 7).
32. 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961). Regarding functionality, see generally Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality" in Trademark Law, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 308 (1986); Zelnick,
The Doctrine of "Functionality," 73 TRADEMARK REP. 128 (1983).
33. Deister, 289 F.2d at 497.
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Figure I

The Deister court set forth four "truisms" as applicable to product
configuration cases:
(I) Trademarks enable one to determine the existence of
common source; but not everything that enables one to determine
source is a trademark.
(2) A trademark distinguishes one man's goods from the
goods of others; but not everything that enables goods to be so distinguished will be protected as a trademark.
(3) Some trademarks are words or configurations which are
protected because they have acquired a "secondary meaning"; but
not every word or configuration that has a de facto "secondary
meaning" is protected as a trademark.
(4) A feature dictated solely by"functional" (utilitarian) considerations may not be protected as a trademark; but mere possession of a function (utility) is not sufficient reason to deny protection. 34
The court distinguished between "functional shapes that are never capable
of being monopolized, even if they become 'distinctive of the applicant's
goods,' and shapes which can be monopolized because they are of such an
arbitrary nature that the law does not recognize a right in the public to copy
them, even if some incidental function is associated with them."35 The
problem in determining the registrability and protectability of product
configurations as trademarks under section 43(a), however, lies between the
34. [d. at 502.
35. [d. al 503, 506.
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two groups of configurations suggested by the court's fourth truism. While
Deister made reference to the existence of these types of configurations in
that truism, it had no need to examine this area, and its references to it are
dicta. Moreover, the court found no indication in the record that the shape
was either arbitrary or inte'nded to indicate origin, and in fact found that the
rhombic shape at issue "perfectly ·exemplifie(dj ... a functional or utilitarian shape which is incapable of acquiring a legally recognizable 'secondary
meaning.' .. 36 As such, the court affirmed the refusal of registration of the
rhombic shape.
The 1976 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.37 represents a major milestone in the development of federal trademark-type protection of product
configurations. In that case, Fruehauf claimed the right to copy the exterior
of a competitor's trailer, the "Cornhusker 800" (see Figure 2 below), relying
primarily upon Sears and Compco. 38 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that neither case was controlling, and that the law of trademarks and the issues of
functionality and secondary meanin~ had not been before the Supreme
Court in the Sears and Compco cases. 9
.

,'---:------~/

\

Figure 2
Following the Deister analysis, at least in part, the Truck Equipment
court relied upon the defendant's own engineering report, which described
the characteristic sloping end walls of the trailer as useless, and held that
those walls were nonfunctional. 40 The court's decision represents a case
near the other extreme from Deister, because the design at issue was considered arbitrary.
In 1982 the CCPA decided III re Morton-Norwich Products. Inc.,41
which further clarified the law applicable to registration of product
36. Id. at 505.
37. 536F.2d 121O(8thCir. 1976).
38. Id. at 1214.

39. /d.
40. "Morar' issues are often found in configuration cases and may affect the outcome. In
Truck Equipment, photographs of plaintiff's trailer had been used in defendant's sales literature. [d. at 1221.
41. 671 F. 2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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configurations as trademarks, and appeared to lit>eralize that law. MortonNorwich involved the shape of a spray container used for cleansers,. for which
the applicant owned both a design and utiHty patent. 42 This design fell i,n
the middle of the range between one entirely determined by function, as .in
Deister, and an arbitrary one, as in Truck Equipment. For a diagram of the
spray container, see Figure 3 below.

Figure 3
In an opinion written by Judge Rich, also the author of the Deister
opinion, the Morton-Norwich court reversed a Trademark Office holding that
the design was functional and remanded the application for a finding on the
issue of distinctiveness. 43 The court undertook to define functionality, first
by distinguishing between de facto and de jure functionality, a distinction
suggested by the fourth Deister truism. In that regard, the court indicated
that de facto functionality amounts to functionality in the layman's sense,
being "the normal or characteristic action of anything.,,44 Functional, in
the lay sense, indicates that "although the design of a product, a container,
or a feature of either is directed to the performance of a function, it may be
legally recognized as an indication of source. ,,45 De jure functionality was
the term applied in Morton-Nonvich to indicate that a design-as a legal
consequence-could not be protected as a trademark, and served as a basis
for the court's remand. 46
Morton-Norwich made two additions to the Deister truisms. First, the
court indicated that "a discussion of 'functionality' is always in reference to
42. /d.
43, M.at 1334.
44. Id.
45. /d. at 1337,
46. Id. (emphasis in original).
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the design of the thing under consideration (in the sense of its appearance)
and not the thing itself."47 Next, the court noted that "a nondistinctive
design does not necessarily equal a 'functional' design."48 The court also
redefined "arbitrary" in connection with the second truism, distinguishing it
from the typical trademark (distinctiveness) use of the word. 49
The key to an understanding of the Morton-Norwich decision is that the
effect on competition issue was viewed by the court as the crux of its analysis. 50 The court resolved the question of de jure functionality by determining whether the "plastic spray bottle ... [was] ... the best or one of a few
superior designs available. ,,51 No evidence was found in the record that "the
shape of appellant's bottle was required to be as it [was] for any de facto
functional reason, which might lead to an affirmative determination of de
jure functionality."52 The court explained that competitors' bottles for similar products demonstrated that "the same functions can be performed by a
variety of other shapes with no sacrifice of any functional advantage.,,53 As
a result, the court concluded that "[c]ompetitors have apparently had no
need to simulate appellant's trade dress, in whole or in part, in order to
enjoy all of the functional aspects of a spray top container."54
The design protection bar had hoped that the Supreme Court would
address the applicability of section 43(a) to product aPfearance in a 1982
case, Inwood Laboratories. Inc. v. Ives Laboratories. Inc. 5 Inwood involved
colored drug capsules which several generic drug manufacturers began
copying after the drug patent expired. 56 The court of appeals had
addressed only a claim under Lanham Act section 32 57 that the defendants
had induced pharmacists to infringe upon plaintiff's registered trademark,
CYCLOSPASMOL, and did not reach the section 43(a) claim. 58 Thereafter,
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court on procedural grounds, and
remanded for consideration of the section 43(a) and state unfair competition
claims. 59 Given this reversal, a discussion of appearance was limited to a
concurring opinion by Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, which
addressed the district court's express finding that the capsule color was
functional in helping patients and physicians identify the drug. 6O
47. Id. at 1338 (emphasis in original).
48. Id. at 1343.
49. Id.

50.ld.atI341.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1342 (emphasis in original).
53. Id.
54. Id. (emphasis in original).
55. 456 US. 844 (1982).
56. Id. at 846-47.
57. 15 US.c. § 1114 (1988).
58. Inwood, 456 US. at 853.
59. Id. at 858-59.
60. Id. at 859, 862-64. On remand. the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the § 43{a) and state law claims based on that court's findings of
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The Honeywell Cases

The shift toward greater federal protection of designs under trademark
law is .best illustrated by two cases, both captioned In re Honeywell. 61 In
1968, Honeywell applied to register the configuration of a round thermostat
cover as a trademark for thermostats. 62 At that time Honeywell had a
design patent on the thermostat as well as two utility patents. The design
patent expired on schedule in 1970 while the trademark application 63 was
under examination. 64 On the second and final appeal to the CCPA regarding that application, the court quoted from the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board's (TTAB) decision under review, as stating well the basis for refusing
registration:
There are only so many basic shapes in which a thermostat or its
cover can be made ... namely, squares, rectangles, or "rounds"
with the latter probably being the most utilitarian configuration of
them all . . . . This is demonstrated by the widespread use over
the years of round-shaped control devices for appliances and similar equipment. The fact that thermostat covers may be produced
in other forms or shapes does not and cannot detract from the
functional character of the configuration here involved. In sum,
the overall configuration of applicant's thermostat cover, as presented for registration, is essentially functional in character and,
as such, it does not possess the necessary attributes of a proprietary trademark necessary for registration. A registration thereof
with the presumption afforded under Section 7(b) of the Trademark Statute would be inconsistent with the avowed and desired
purpose of preserving the freedom to copy functional features of a
device long protected both under common law and by statutory
interpretation of what constitutes a registrable trademark. 65
Later, in 1986, Honeywell applied for trademark registration of a
slightly different round thermostat cover configuration. 66 This application
was refused by the examiner on the basis of the res judicata effect of the earlier determination of functionality. On appeal, the TTAB noted that the
applicant never had an opportunity to introduce additional evidence in the
prior case, and that the new record reflected events in the marketplace during the seventeen years since the original application record was closed.
The TTAB further noted that the mark in the new application differed from
functionality and lack of secondary meaning. 72 TRADEMARK REP. 117 (1982).
61. 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Honeywell I); 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B. 1988)
(HoneywellI/).
62. Honeywell I. 532 F.2d at 181.
63. Id. at 181 n.3.
64. Honeywell 1/. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
65. Honeywell I. 532 F.2d at 182-83.
66. Honeywell 1/. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601 n.l.
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the earlier one because it disclaimed the transparent window and, therefore,
lacked the issue of visibility of the temperature controlling and indicating
mechanism. 67 Thus. the TTA B concluded that res jud icata did not bar consideration of the new application. For a diagram of the thermostat dial, see
Figure 4 below.

Figure 4

The ITAB then considered factors discussed in Morton-Norwich, and
concluded that although the number of alternative designs is limited, the
Examining Attorney for the PTO had not demonstrated by a preponderance
of the evidence that the cover was de jure functional. Accordingly, the
PTO's refusal to register was reversed. til!

E.

Aesthetic Functionality

"Aesthetic functionality" is based upon the theory that when goods are
bought largely for their aesthetic value, the aesthetic features may be considered functional because they contribute to that value. The determination
of de jure functionality under this theory appears similar to other functionality tests, namely, whether or not prohibition of imitation by others will
substantially hinder them in competition.tll)
67. /d.

at

1601-03.

68. Id. at 1603-05.
69. See generally Fletcher. The Defense of "FIII/ctiol/at" Trademark Use: If What Is Filllctiona I Canl/ot Be a Trademark. How Cal/ a Trademark Be Fllnctional? 75 TRADEMARK
REP. 249 (1985); Duft. "Aesthetic" FIII/ctiol/ality. 73 TRADEMARK REP. 151 (1983).
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In Pagliero v. Wallace China CO.,70 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit refused protection against copying of floral designs on dinner plates
sold to restaurants as replacements for broken dishes. The court stated: uIf
the particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success
of the product, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in the
absence of a patent or copyright.'>71
The aesthetic functionality theory has not been widely accepted in
other circuits. 72 Moreover, the theory was restricted by the Ninth Circuit in
Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Ellterprises. IIIC.,13 wherein the court affirmed
the protection of Vuitton's VL and floral logo design, which was repeated
over the surface of luggage and handbags.
IV.

THE BONITO DECISION

The recent unanimous Supreme Court decision in Bonito Boats. Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats. Inc. 74 confirms the vitality of the Sears and Compeo
decisions. Like those earlier decisions, Bonito held that federal patent law
preempted a state law which removed from public use something the public
would have been free to use under the patent law. The Florida statute which
the Court struck down in Bonito prohibited the knowing sale of boat hulls
made by direct molding, also known as plug molding. 75
The dicta in Bonito is relevant to the present discussion in several respects.
First, Bonito holds that "Congress may not create patent monopolies of unlimited duration . . . . ,,76 In addition, Bonito explains that federal patent law,
including design patent law, embodies "a careful balance between the need to
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.'m Finally, Bonito emphasizes the policy that "the ultimate
goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public
domain through disclosure... 78 The Court stated, "We have long held that after
the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of the patent passes to the
free use of the public as a matter of federallaw.,,79 In the context of the balance
struck in the patent laws over 200 years, the Court noted that U[a]t the heart of
Sears and Compco is the conclusion that the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented
design and utilitarian conceptions.',8o
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.

198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
[d. al 343.
See 1.T. McCARTHY. supra nole 16, § 7.26(D) (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 198~).
644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
Id. at 145.
/d. al 146.
/d.
Id. al 151.
[d. al 152.
Id. al 156.
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The boat hull in Bonito was characterized by the Court as standing "in
the same stead as an item for which a patent has expired or been denied: it is
unpatented and unpatentable.,,8. The Court explained that the protection
provided by the Florida statute "conflicts with the federal policy 'that all
ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they
are protected by a valid patent.' ,,82
Unlike Sears and Compeo, Bonito recognizes the existence of a federal
law of unfair competition. Nevertheless, the references in Bonito to Sears
and Compeo do not appear to include the "other federal statutory protection" language of Compeo83 on which practitioners and lower courts have
relied in applying the Lanham Act to protection of product configurations.
For example, Bonito relies upon Sears for the proposition that states "may
protect business in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in
the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings,
from misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods.,,84 However, the
Bonito Court exhibited a narrow view of the common law of unfair competition's ability to limit use of a product configuration, stating:
We believe that the Florida statute at issue in this case so substantially impedes the public use of the otherwise unprotected
design and utilitarian idea embodied in unpatented boat hulls as to
run afoul of the teaching of our decisions in Sears and Compeo. It
is readily apparent that the Florida statute does not operate to prohibit "unfair competition" in the usual sense that the term is
understood. The law of unfair competition has its roots in the
common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting
consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern may
result in the creation of "quasi-property rights" in communicative
symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation. Judge
Hand captured the distinction well in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn
& Bishop Co. where he wrote:
"[T]he plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through false representations that those are his wares
which in fact are not, but he may not monopolize any
design or pattern, however trifling. The defendant, on the
other hand, may copy plaintiff's goods slavishly down to
the minutest detail: but he may not represent himself as
the plaintiff in their sale."8s
8J. Id. at 159.
82. Id. (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969».
83. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
84. Bonito, 489 U.S. at 154 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232

(1964».
85. Id. at 157 (citation omitted).
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Bonito's lack of acknowledgement of the current extent of design
protection under unfair competition law is perhaps best reflected by the next
paragraph of its opinion:

With some notable exceptions, including the interpretation of
the Illinois law of unfair competition at issue in Sears and Compco,
the common-law tort of unfair competition has been limited to protection against copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which have acquired secondary meaning such that they operate
as a designation of source. The '!protection" granted a particular
design under the law of unfair competition is thus limited to one
context where consumer confusion is likely to result; the design
"idea" itself may be freely exploited in all other contexts. 86
While the Bonito opinion did refer to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
it did so in a way that reflects either a naivete, or perhaps, an unwillingness
to accept the extent to which design protection has been extended in the
name of that statute:
Indeed, there are affirmative indications from Congress that
both the law of unfair competition and trade secret protection are
consistent with the balance struck by the patent laws. Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act creates a federal remedy for making "a
false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe
or represent the same . . . . " Congress has thus given federal
recognition to many of the concerns which underlie the state tort
of unfair competition, and the application of Sears and Compco to
nonfunctional aspects of a product which have been shown to
identify source must take account of competing federal policies in
this regard. 87
It should be noted that Bonito reached the Supreme Court because of a
conflict between the Florida Supreme Court's holding that federal law preempted the state plug mold statute and the Federal Circuit's conclusion in
Interpart Corp. v. [talia, 88 that a similar California law posed no threat to the
federal patent laws. 89 The Supreme Court's Bonito decision implicitly
rejects the Interpart decision, and expressly rejects the Federal Circuit's
proposition that the patent laws" 'say nothing about the right to copy or the
right to use.' ,,90 Moreover, the Bonito Court's decision emphasized the
86. /d. at 157-58 (citations omitted).
87. Jd. at 166 (citations omitted). It is doubtful that Congress intended the scope of protection now extended to designs under § 43(a). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying
text.
88. 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
89. Bonito. 489 U.S. at 143-44.
90. Jd. at 163 (quoting Jnterpart. 777 F.2d at 685).
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federal power over patent law, characterizing the federal standards as an
expression of a congressional determination that the states simply could not
ignore. 9•
V.

COMMENTARY ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF PROTECTING
PRODUCT CONFIGURATIONS UNDER TRADEMARK LAW

Attention now turns from what the law is, to where the law is going.
Primarily at issue is whether federal trademark registrations and unfair
competition law are appropriate methods to protect product configurations.
Relevant to such an inquiry are three principal problem areas: the absence
of any limitation of term of protection, the uncertainty regarding where the
line of protectability should be drawn, and problems relating to secondary
meaning.

A.

Limited Term

It is clear that the founders of our nation intended to limit monopolies,
since the federal government was granted only the power to secure to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries for "limited times."92 A sense of the meaning of "limited times" in
our Constitution may be determined by inspection of the patent and copyright laws in force in Great Britain when our Constitution was written, and
of those which were first adopted in this country.
The British Statute of Monopolies of 162493 provided a patent term of
fourteen years. 94 The 1709 Statute of Queen Anne 95 had set the term of
British copyright at fourteen years, with the possibility of a fourteen-year
renewal if the author was living at the end of the first term. 96 The first
United States patent97 and copyright98 statutes, both adopted in 1790, provided the same periods of protection as their British counterparts. 99
91. Id. at 164-65.
92. "Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
93. Great Britain. Statutes at Large, 21 Jac. I, ch.3 (1624).
94. Id. This was the term for new patents. The term for patents in effect at the time of
enactment was 21 years. See generally Armitage, Tim Hundred Years of English Patent
Law, in Two HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 5, at 4; B.W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF
AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 39,54-55 (1967).
95. Great Britain, Statutes at Large, 8 Anne. ch.19 (1709).
96. Id. See general/y Stewart, Tim Hundred Years of English Copyright Law, in Two HUNDRED YEARS. supra note 5, at 81; B.W. BUGBEE. supra note 94. at 53-55.
97. Act of Apr. 10. 1790. I Stat. 109.
98. Act of May 31. 1790. I Stat. 124.
99. See generally Forman, 7i,'0 Hundred Years of American Patent Law. in Two HUNDRED
YEARS, supra note 5, at 28-29; Ringer. TI"o Hundred Years of American Copyright Law,
in Two HUNDRED YEARS. supra note 5. at 127; B.W. BUGBEE. supra note 94. at 144.
146. Some have speculated that the multiples of seven years were based on seven-year
apprenticeships. which were common in the 17th and 18th centuries. Thus, a reason-
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The Supreme Court has strictly construed the "limited times" provision. For example, in 1829, the Court held that one cannot obtain a patent
after the public has been permitted to freely use the subject of the patent. 100
Later, in 1896, the Court held that" 'on the expiration of a patent the monopoly granted by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly
covered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition that
the patent is granted."oIOI Bonito continues this strict construction,102 by
stating: "Sears and Compco extended that rule to potentially patentable
ideas which are fully exposed to the public.,,103
In the case of trademarks, there is no limitation of term, and protection
continues for as long as use does. 104 Although this unlimited term is admittedly appropriate for most conventional trademarks, it is doubtful whether
an unlimited term is appropriate for industrial design configurations which
have a de facto functional aspect, albeit perhaps less than the de jure
functionality defined in Morton-Norwich. 105 The ultimate answer to this
issue may depend upon where the line of protection is drawn.

B.

Where Should the Line Be Drawn?

The usual justifications for extending federal trademark protection to
product configurations include those stated in Truck Equipment. One
justification is that the language of Sears and Compco regarding permissible
state regulation of labeling is mere dicta. 106 Another is to distinguish the
types of protection, as was done in Truck Equipme1lt:
The protection accorded by the law of trademark and unfair
competition is greater than that accorded by the law of patents
because each is directed at a different purpose. The latter protects
inventive activity which, after a term of years, is dedicated to the
public domain. The former protects commercial activity which,
in our society, is essentially private. 107
Some proponents of section 43(a) and trademark registration protection of
product configurations classify those provisions of the Lanham Act within

100.
10 I.
102.
103.
104.
105.

106.
107.

able term of an exclusive right granted in exchange for disclosure of intellectual effort
was the length of two to four apprenticeships.
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) I (1829). Current law provides a one year grace
period before filing is required. 35 U.S.c. § 102(b) (1982).
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. III. 120 (1938) (quoting Singer Mfg. Co.
v. June Mfg. Co.. 163 U.S. 169.185 (1896».
Bonito Boats. Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats. Inc .. 489 U.S. 141. 165 (1989).
Id. 8111 see McCarthy. Important Trends. slIpra note 30. at 96 nn.7-8.
In the case of registrations. the formality of a declaration of use and renewal applications is required. 15 US.c. §§ 1058-1059 (1988).
See slIpra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
Truck Equip. Servo CO. V. Fruehauf Corp.. 536 E2d 1210. 1214. 1215 n.6 (8th Cir.
1976).
/d. at 1215.
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the "design patent or other federal statutory protection" without which,
Compeo explains, a design can be copied at will. 108
When evaluating cases involving claims of unfair competition under
state law, the Supreme Court has repeatedly examined whether the subject
matter is of the type addressed by the patent and copyright laws. In Sears,
Compeo, and Bonito, the Court held that state protection was preempted by
the federal patent and copyright laws. 109 Is there any reason to believe that
the Court would not consider the relative scope of the patent and copyright
laws in evaluating a claim to trademark law protection of a design?
The Sears, Compeo, and Bonito decisions constitute dicta insofar as
they go beyond their preemption holdings. Nevertheless, it would be unwise
to ignore any of the language in those Supreme Court decisions when
attempting to determine where the Supreme Court would draw the line
delineating permissible protection of product and container configurations.
Sears and Compeo appeared to focus on the use of traditional" 'trademarks,
labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods.' ,,110 While recognizing
the existence of section 43(a) and other unfair competition protection related to
designs, Bonito also takes this restrictive position.
In discussing section 43(a), Bonito appears to have used "nonfunctional"
in a de facto sense in referring to nonfunctional aspects of a product which
have been shown to identify source. Similarly, when discussing the
justifications offered for plug mold statutes, the Court stated, "Where an item
in general circulation is unprotected by patent, '[r]eproduction of a functional
attribute is legitimate competitive activity.' "III Such references, directed to
the functional aspect or attribute of a product rather than the product as a
whole, do not reflect the type of evaluation involved in a determination of de
jure functionality as found, for example, in Morton-Norwieh. 112 In fact, the
Bonito Court expressly notes Congress' refusal to enact legislation in the area
of design protection stating:
Congress has considered extending various forms of limited
protection to industrial design either through the copyright laws or
by relaxing the restrictions on the availability of design patents.
Congress explicitly refused to take this step in the copyright laws,
and despite sustained criticism for a number of years, it has declined
to alter the patent protections presently available for industrial
108. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 US. 234,238 (1964).
109. Bonito distinguished the contractual protection of trade secrets which was approved in

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1970) and Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 US. 257 (1979) as regulation not inconsistent with the patent law. Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US. 141, 155-57 (1989).
110. Bonito, 489 US. at 154 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 US. 225, 232
(1964».
I I I. Bonito, 489 US. at 164 (quoting Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,
456 US. 844, 863 (1982) (White, 1, concurring».
112. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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design. It is for Congress to determine if the present system of
design and utility patents is ineffectual in promoting the useful arts
in the context of industrial design. 113
C.

The Problems with Developing Secondary Meaning

The final problems regarding trademark protection of product
configurations to be discussed in this Article are two relating to secondary
meaning. In order to obtain trademark law protection for. a design which is
not totally arbitrary, secondary meaning must be shown through substantially
continuous and exclusive use over a period of time, usually measured in
years. 114 Unless there is some other form of protection, the design will be
unprotected while that secondary meaning develops. Thus, trademark protection is less than satisfactory for most new product configurations, and, without
protection at the outset, copiers can prevent the creation of secondary meaning. 115
That leads to the principal problem with secondary meaning: trademark
protection of a design following a period of protection of another kind, for
example, a design patent. What happens to the right to freely copy at the expiration of a patent, which was emphasized in Bonito, is unclear. 116 If secondary
meaning is meant to represent the lack of competitors' need to use a design, it
is unclear whether someone can develop secondary meaning during a period
when the lack of competition is due to some other form of intellectual property
protection. 117
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Bonito opinion reminds us that Congress has yet to enact a design
law based on registration and that, should a case of product configuration protection under federal trademark law reach the Supreme Court, the scope of
protection granted may be considerably less than that afforded by Morton-Norwich. In sum, trademark protection of product configuration is not a sure
thing.

113. Bonito. 489 U.S. at 167-68 (citations omitted).
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
115. Problems such as this have led some courts to protect "secondary meaning in the making." See generally Scagnelli. Dawn of a New Doctrine?-Trademark Protection for
Incipient Secondary Meaning. 71 TRADEMARK REP. 527 (1981).
116. See Bonito. 489 U.S. at 154-56.
117. This question was involved in the Honeywell cases. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.

